THE BORDERS OF VIETNAM'S EARLY WARTIME TRADE WITH SOUTHERN CHINA A Contemporary Perspective
Christopher E. Goscha that the French controlled the modem industrial sectors of the Vietnamese colonial economy, a good part of its richest rice-growing areas, and its major ports, the DRV had to rely on the traditional economy and its local artisans.
Until the early 1950s in the north (and no doubt longer in the south), the Viet Minh relied largely on the local village economy to feed and house its soldiers and civil servants.8 The state would not really make itself felt seriously until the early 1950s.9 Sabotage remained the main economic policy (kinh te pha hoai) for fighting the French in the major cities, at least until this started to hurt the DRV's capacity to import vital items from those same "foreign" markets. Although the government maintained theoretically strict control over products relating to national defense (at least in the north until 1947), it is unlikely that DRV customs and police forces were in a position to stop widespread border smuggling. Instead the Viet Minh often tried to turn this "underground" trade its way in the early period (see below).
As for communications, because of Vietnam's thin, "S"-like shape on the eastern edge of the Indochinese Peninsula and French domination of the major French Indochinese roads until the early 1950s, the Vietnamese and Chinese coastal junk trade became one of the most important ways by which the DRV conducted its commercial exchanges both inside and outside the coun- None of this, however, was as easy as I have summarized here. Besides having to deal with the three French armed forces, the DRV lacked access to international credit and aid. There was no assistance from the World Bank or International Monetary Fund; the DRV was not officially recognized by any government in the world. If the DRV printed its own money, it was often at the mercy of the French or subject to rampant internal inflation.1" To generate funds for purchasing imports, the Viet Minh applied a variety of resistance taxes on agricultural products, on imports and exports in its zones, held gold weeks, tried to monopolize the opium and pepper trades, and apparently did quite well speculating on the artificially over-valued Bank of Indochina piastre.12 Foreign trade was another way of procuring badly needed imports and generating much needed hard currency. And as in the Indonesian revolution, the Chinese were an important part of this. Whether it was trading with southern China or even in the French-controlled zones, the Vietnamese had to tap into age-old Chinese trading networks in order to run their external commerce. Even locally, the Viet Thang was often obligated to procure its paper products from Chinese-owned paper mills. According to a Vietnamese involved in these exchanges, the paper industry in the area of Qui Nhon was "entirely in the hands of the Chinese. Or to put it another way, the French Deuxieme Bureau and the U.S. CIA were not the only ones involved in the narcotics trade. And rather than reducing this complex economic question to a black-and-white moral call between "right" and "wrong," it might be more rewarding to explore the economic, border zones, and not just one, and perhaps not quite where we had expected.
